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The aim of this paper is to study preference heterogeneity in monetary policy committees of inflation-targeting (IT) 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during the period 2005−2010. It employs (individual) voting records of the 
Monetary Council of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of Hungary) and of the Monetary Policy Council of the 
National Bank of Poland. Preference heterogeneity in committees is not directly observable. Therefore, we pursue an 
indirect measurement and conduct an econometric analysis based on (pooled) Taylor-type reaction functions estimated 
using real-time information on economic and financial indicators and voting records. Recent evidence for the monetary 
policy committees (MPCs) of advanced economies (see Besley et al., 2008; and Jung, 2011) suggests that preference 
heterogeneity among its members is systematic. Unlike for monetary policy committees of advanced countries, the 
present paper finds preference heterogeneity to be random for both the members of the Monetary Policy Council of the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP), and the members of the Monetary Council of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). But, similar 
to the committees of advanced economies, the diversity of views on the inflation forecast is measurable in both 
committees. A separate cluster analysis shows that different preferences of MPC members may be attributable to their 
status (chairman, internal member, external member) and that members may also differ in their desired response to 
changes in the economic outlook.
JEL: C23, D72, D83, E58.
Keywords: central banking, monetary policy committee, inflation targeting, collective decision-making, voting, 
preferences, pooled regressions.
A tanulmány az inflációs célkövetést alkalmazó kelet-közép-európai országok monetáris döntéshozó testületeiben vizs-
gálja a preferenciák heterogenitását 2005 és 2010 között. Ehhez a magyar és a lengyel nemzeti bank monetáris taná csainak 
név szerinti szavazatait használja. Mivel a preferenciák heterogenitása közvetlenül nem megfigyelhető, az ökonometriai 
elemzés indirekt módszert alkalmaz: összevont (pooled) Taylor-típusú reakciófüggvényt becsül valós idejű gazdasági és 
pénzügyi információk és az egyéni szavazatok alapján. A fejlett gazdaságok monetáris tanácsaira vonatkozó friss eredmé-
nyek (Besley et al., 2008; Jung, 2011) szerint a monetáris tanácstagok közötti heterogenitás szisztematikus. Ezzel szemben 
e tanulmány eredményei azt mutatják, hogy mind a magyar, mind a lengyel tanácsban véletlenszerű a preferenciák 
heterogenitása. Mindazonáltal a fejlett országokhoz hasonlóan az inflációs előrejelzéssel kapcsolatos vélemények eltérése 
mindkét testületben számottevő. A klaszterelemzés eredményei szerint a tagok preferenciáinak eltérése köthető a tanács-
ban betöltött szerephez (elnök, belső, külső tag), valamint a tagok között különbség lehet abban is, ahogyan a gazdasági 
kilátások változásaira kívánnak reagálni.
Abstract
Összefoglalás
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The global march towards greater transparency has reached the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In recent 
years, more information on the monetary policy processes of the CEE central banks has been made available to the public. 
Overall, inflation targeting frameworks in the CEE countries have performed remarkably well during the past decade. The 
increased popularity of inflation targeting (IT) has led to visible improvements regarding transparency and accountability 
in monetary policy. Other main benefits typically associated with inflation targeting are the following. First, inflation 
targeting successfully lowers inflation and makes it less volatile. Second, it reduces the real costs of disinflation. Third, it 
anchors long-run inflation expectations. An ongoing debate is whether inflation targeting countries perform better than 
those that have other monetary policy strategies. Blinder et al. (2008) suggest that many studies provide clear evidence 
that the IT strategy has succeeded in anchoring inflation expectations. While most economists would subscribe to this 
view for advanced economies, it is less clear whether for economies in transition a similar point can be made. In studies 
that include emerging economies and CEE countries, Goncalves and Salles (2008) and Lin and Ye (2009) report significant 
positive effects of inflation targeting, whereas Brito and Bystedt (2010) find that inflation targeting regimes do not lower 
the costs of disinflation.
Nowadays, it is widely established practice that monetary policy decisions are made by a committee and not by a single 
policy-maker (examples of central banks with a single policy-maker in charge of monetary policy are the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand and the Bank of Israel). In committees, as illustrated by the popular hawk-doves analogy, it is widely taken 
for granted that its members have different preferences. Nevertheless, monetary policy committees keep the dynamics 
of their regular committee interactions confidential (see Bank for International Settlements, 2008 and 2009). If not 
communicated, policy-makers’ individual preferences will therefore not be observed by the public in real-time. More 
openness on the motives of individual policy-makers and the way they make decisions could help the public to better 
understand and predict their decisions. Several tools exist by which central banks may communicate the degree of 
consensus on policy rates among committee members. The conventional spectrum includes transcripts, minutes and voting 
records of the committee meetings, which to a varying degree and timeliness provide information on the diversity of views 
in the committee. In the CEE, three central banks [the central bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB) since 2005, 
the National Bank of Poland (NBP) since 1998, and most recently the Czech National Bank (CNB)] have published (individual) 
voting records which contain information on agreement and dissent by member shortly after the policy meeting. Such 
voting records are an important source on diversity among policy-makers in these committees but they have known 
shortcomings. It has been shown for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that members of a policy committee may 
not always reveal their “true” preferences in public (see Meade, 2005; McCracken, 2010). Blinder (2007) attributes this 
phenomenon to the practice of policymaking by consensus that would suppress public dissent. Available evidence for CEE 
countries suggests that voting records may contain valuable information about agreement and dissent by members and 
about future interest rate moves (see Horváth, Smidková and Zápal, 2010).
The present paper aims to study heterogeneity in policy preferences among committee members in those CEE countries 
for which voting records are available for a sufficient long period. It makes a contribution to the literature by providing 
and comparing empirical evidence on preference heterogeneity among inflation-targeting CEE countries during the period 
2005−2010. Given that neither preference heterogeneity nor diversity of views in committees is directly observable, we 
pursue an indirect measurement and conduct an econometric analysis based on (pooled) Taylor-type reaction functions. 
These we estimate using real-time information available from published inflation reports and (individual) voting records. 
The empirical analysis includes the Monetary Policy Committee of the central bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 
MNB) and the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) during the period 2005−2010. 
1  introduction
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INTRODUCTION
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews why heterogeneity is a factor in the monetary policy process 
involving committees. Section 3 explains the monetary policy process in two inflation targeting central banks in the CEE, 
the MNB and NBP. Section 4 provides the results from an econometric analysis on preference heterogeneity. Section 5 
concludes.
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Interactions between members of a monetary policy committee are complex and involve frequent meetings. Extensive 
internal discussions aim at facilitating a joint assessment of the economic outlook and of its implications for the monetary 
policy stance. Discussions in committees require considerable staff input. In this respect, Csajbók (2008) finds that 
inflation targeting central banks and, what he calls consensus-seeking MPCs, rely more on staff input than other central 
banks. Information by staff is normally accessible by all committee members, and represents information common to all 
members. Prior to each committee meeting committee members collect information relevant for the policy decision and 
share the available information and expertise at policy meetings. 
Learning among peers has several benefits (see Blinder et al., 2008 and Jung, Mongelli and Moutot, 2010). It is part of the 
committee interaction and makes monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty more robust. Most central 
banks provide no detailed information regarding this aspect of the decision making process by monetary policy committees. 
The information cascade model (see e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998) suggests that in an uncertain 
environment committee members do not simply form their views based on their own information set obtained prior to the 
meeting, but also take into account the opinions expressed by fellow members, speaking earlier during the discussion. An 
exchange of views about the economic outlook among members in a confidential environment contributes to a well 
informed decision. At the end of each meeting the committee has to take a monetary policy decision which is either an 
unchanged monetary policy stance or an adjustment of policy rates. 
Diversity across policy-makers is an important feature of voting by monetary policy committees. The literature on 
monetary policy committees widely emphasises that diversity in monetary policy committees has beneficial effects which 
makes them superior to single individuals (see Blinder, 2004; Blinder et al., 2008; Mihov and Sibert, 2006; Bank for 
International Settlements, 2009). It is thus no surprise that in a clear majority of central banks committees are in charge 
of interest rate decisions. Nevertheless, the practice of revealing the diversity of views within the committee is far less 
uniform. Benefits and costs have to be weighed. Revealing diversity may make a central bank more predictable, thereby 
helping it to better anchor inflation expectations and to smooth volatility. At the same time, communicating diversity may 
distort the process of accountability, if the committee wants to emphasise collective and not individual accountability.
It is widely observed that committee members have different preferences. For example, Blinder (1998) observes that 
members in a committee have different preferences and need to compromise positions. For that reason, he suggests that 
the “central tendency” in a committee is by far more inertial (i.e. less variable) than that of a single policy-maker. 
Heterogeneity in a monetary policy committee is often related to different skills and backgrounds and to different 
preferences or views of its members. Most studies though are not clear about the factors driving diversity in the 
committee. Is it the result of different preferences among policy-makers, as the Hawks-Doves model would predict, or is 
it the result of different views on economic data or is it owing to information asymmetries in the committee? 
In the deliberations of monetary policy committees, policy-makers with different preferences may disagree on what 
constitutes the most appropriate policy response even though they fully share the strategy and the goal(s) of the central 
bank. In committee interactions information asymmetries may arise, because members have different professional 
backgrounds, information processing skills, and members may have “private” information which they do not share with 
their peers. Information asymmetries can also grow with the size of the committee (see Erhart and Vasquez-Paz, 2007). 
According to Sibert (2002) “groupthink” can occur if the same members meet regularly. Groupthink implies that individual 
members have an incentive to hide their disagreement, thereby making it impossible to distinguish between individual and 
collective preferences of committee members.
2  Heterogeneity in the monetary 
policy process
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HETEROGENEITY IN THE MONETARY POLICY PROCESS
Monetary policy committees can often be distinguished regarding their composition in terms of external and internal 
members (see Table 1). In committees that distinguish between the appointment of internal and external members or 
between members at the centre and in the regions, preference heterogeneity has sometimes been attributed to the 
membership status. Several studies for the Bank of England’s MPC suggest that external members would dissent more 
frequently, tend to be more dovish than internal members and contribute to lower interest rates (see Gerlach-Kristen, 
2003a and 2009; Spencer, 2006). A study by Berk, Bierut and Meade (2010) suggests that these differences would be mainly 
related to the end of their tenure. While it is theoretically plausible to expect that members may get more hawkish 
towards the end of their tenure (see Mihov and Sibert, 2006), reappointments are infrequent in practice, thus making it 
difficult to trace tenure effects. Evidence from the FOMC on preference heterogeneity between Governors and Bank 
Presidents is more mixed. While in one of the first analyses on that subject Tootell (1991) rejected preference heterogeneity 
on regional grounds, several studies examining votes cast by FOMC members in the 1990s find that policy-makers’ interest 
rate preferences are sensitive to regional unemployment rates (see Meade and Sheets, 2005; Chappell, McGregor, and 
Vermilyea, 2008; McCracken, 2010). 
In the CEE region there may be also differences between central bank committees along these lines. We focus on the 
three largest countries (Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic). At the MNB, there is traditionally an overweight of 
external members. Similarly, the monetary policy committee of the NBP comprises 9 external members, and only the 
chairman is an internal member. At the CNB, the distinction is not relevant, because all members are internal members 
like in Sweden. It is also noteworthy that over time the overweight of the external members at the MNB has become 
much smaller. In 2005, with 13 members (4 internal and 9 external), there was still a clear balance in favour of the 
external members, more like in Poland. Since 2009, with a total of 7 members (3 internal and 4 external members) the 
balance has changed towards parity, and the overweight of the external members has been reduced to one member. This 
has to be seen against the background that frequent changes in the central bank law have reduced the committee size 
in Hungary gradually from 13 to 7 members in Hungary, whereas the size of the committees in Poland and the Czech 
Republic has remained unchanged.
Table 1
Key voting characteristics of monetary policy committees in Europe
CEE countries western European countries
Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank  
(the central 
bank of 
Hungary)
National Bank 
of poland
Czech National 
Bank
Bank of England
sveriges 
riksbank
ECB
Number of voting members 7 10 7 9 6 23
Internal members 3 1 7 5 6 6
External members 4 9 0 4 0 17
Changes in the 
committee size
Gradual 
decrease in the 
number of 
members to 7
Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged
Increase in the 
number of 
external 
members
Number of regular 
meetings on monetary 
policya 
12 12 8b 12 6 12
Meetings with changes in 
policy rates (period 2005 to 
2010)
24 21 19 15 24 15
Meetings with no changes in 
policy rates (period 2005 to 
2010)
38 51 33 45 16 45
“Activism” ratio 
Frequency of policy rate 
changes in relation to 
number of meetings (period 
2005 to 2010)
39% 29% 32 (26)%c 25% 60 (30)%c 25%
Notes: Most interest rate changes in the sample were by 25 or 50 basis points. a) Including unscheduled meetings such as conference calls. b) Prior to 
2008 the number of meetings per year was 12. c) Value in brackets denotes approximate ratio based on monthly meetings for better comparability. 
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IT central banks are known for their high standards in terms of transparency on monetary policy (for a comparison see 
Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006). They have in common that they disclose a wide range of information on the monetary policy 
process. In addition to the publication of detailed macroeconomic forecasts in the Inflation Reports, this may include the 
publication of MPC minutes, and possibly individual voting records.1 Based on a survey of central bank practice on 
transparency, Dincer and Eichengreen (2007 and 2009) find that CEE countries with an IT regime have greatly improved 
over the last decade and are broadly comparable to countries in Western Europe. Though, only a few CEE countries have, 
by now, published data on individual voting records for a sufficient long time span that can be used to carry out formal, 
quantitative analysis (see Bank for Internatioal Settlements, 2008). 
In the CEE, three central banks have published (individual) voting records which contain information on agreement and 
dissent by member shortly after the policy meeting: these have been since 1998 the NBP, since end-2004 the MNB, and 
since 2006 the CNB have published attributed voting records. From 2000 to 2006, the CNB only published the balance of 
votes without attribution to individual board members. More recently, the CNB has started publishing the transcripts of 
past meetings (six years back), so that in total attributed voting records for a disconnected time span of 1998−2004 and 
2008-2011 are available at the moment. While this suffices for certain analyses of voting patterns (for an analysis of the 
CNB’s voting records see Horváth et al., 2010), the present method using reaction functions with real-time data requires 
a coherent data set with at least 40 to 50 observations. Based on CNB’s current publication policy, the gap will disappear 
1  For the monetary policy committees of several IT central banks voting records are available: Sweden, the UK, Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Korea, Philippines, and for a few non-IT central banks: the US and Japan.
3  Decision-making in selected CEE 
inflation-targeting countries
Table 2
Key elements of the monetary policy process in Hungary and poland
Element Hungary poland
Monetary policy committee
a) Name of the committee
b) Meeting frequency
c) Interest rate proposal
Monetary Council
monthly
tour de table opened by the chief 
economist
Monetary Policy Council
monthly
each member may propose a “motion” on 
interest rates
Monetary policy strategy
a) Adoption
b) Inflation target
c) Exchange rate regime
IT since mid-2001
3.0% (headline CPI)
floating
IT since 1998
2.5% ±1% tolerance band (headline CPI)
freely floating
Main inputs to interest rate decisions
a) Staff projections
b) Interest rate assumption
c) Other inputs
quarterly
constant interest rates*
scenario analyses
wide range of economic, financial, 
monetary variables
three times a year
market interest rates (main)/ constant interest 
rates (alternative)
scenario analyses
wide range of economic, financial, monetary 
variables
External communication
a) Inflation reports
b) Minutes
c) Voting records
d) Other tools
quarterly
since end-2004
since end-2004
fan charts, statements
three times a year (since 2008)
since 2007
since 1998
fan charts
statements (including monetary policy bias 
until January 2005) 
Note: * in 2011 the MNB introduced an endogenous path.
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DECISION-MAKING IN SELECTED CEE INFLATION-TARGETING COUNTRIES
by 2014. Only then it will be possible to apply the approach pursued this paper for a consecutive 15 year long dataset of 
the CNB.2 
In the remainder of this paper we therefore focus on two of these three largest CEE countries, Hungary and Poland. Both 
economies are relatively small, with open capital accounts and very strong trade and financial links to the euro area. Since 
2004 Hungary and Poland are members of the EU. They have adopted a flexible exchange rate regime, and do not 
participate in the exchange rate regime ERM II. The law in both countries grants the central bank with full independence 
in the pursuit of the primary objective, price stability. As we will discuss below (for a summary see Table 2), the MNB and 
the NBP share several features concerning the monetary policy process, but there are also some differences.
3.1  THE CAsE of HuNGAry
Hungary introduced inflation targeting in mid-2001, when inflation was around 10%. The choice of a new nominal anchor 
was a large shift in monetary policy following the exchange rate-based monetary regimes that were in place since the 
beginning of the transition in 1990. Various elements of a fully fledged IT regime have been in place from the beginning. 
Since 2005, the central bank of Hungary (MNB) has set a medium-term inflation target of 3% defined in terms of headline 
CPI. The transmission of monetary policy works via the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel and the 
expectations channel. For some time, given the relatively underdeveloped financial markets, the most important 
transmission channel of monetary policy was the direct effect of the exchange rate on traded prices and thus on inflation. 
By now, due to the growing share of foreign exchange loans the monetary transmission through the exchange rate has 
changed substantially (see e.g. Endrész and Krekó, 2010).
As Csermely (2006) observes, the MNB faced initial weaknesses with the IT strategy. First, IT was introduced while an 
exchange rate band was still in place, though it was much wider than previously (a ‘shadow ERM II’ with ±15% band around 
the euro). Second, the support of fiscal policy was essentially missing: the lack of fiscal discipline was accompanied by 
the frequent misses of euro adoption target dates set by the government, which in turn always triggered a large risk 
premium shock, further complicating the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, in the first years of the IT regime, 
policymakers adopted a consensual style of decision-making and their communications on interest rate decisions mainly 
relied on the statement of the Monetary Council (followed by a more detailed quarterly Inflation Report). No minutes were 
published and no indications on the individual votes were disclosed. 
After the first experience, a number of adjustments were made to the IT framework. The Bank reduced inflation with 
gradually decreasing inflation targets, an approach that bears resemblance to the Bank of Canada’s positive experience 
with time-varying inflation control targets in the early 1990s. Though, it was an attempt to address the inherent conflict 
between meeting the inflation target and stabilising the Forint within the exchange rate band. This was apparent from a 
speculative attack on the exchange rate band in early 2003. Following this episode, the MNB took further measures. It 
became more careful in its communications in times when a potential conflict between the inflation targets and the 
exchange rate band could arise. In 2005, the MNB adopted a permanent, medium-term inflation target (effective from 
2007), thereby marking a departure from the setting of short-term (annual) targets and moving closer to the approach of 
the leading contenders in IT. Then, in February 2008 the MNB adopted a floating exchange rate regime for the forint/euro 
exchange rate.
The Bank’s Inflation Report is a key channel for the MNB’s communications with the public. In its Inflation Report the Bank 
provides a forward-looking assessment of the economic situation and illustrates its risk assessment using fan charts. The 
MNB explored further ways on how to reveal diversity of the internal deliberations to the public. Effective the meeting of 
December 2004, the MNB published minutes of the Monetary Council deliberations together with members’ votes. Initially 
these minutes included only the balance of votes without attribution to members. Since October 2005 individual votes of 
committee members have been reported. The main motivation behind the publication of minutes was to increase 
transparency regarding the diversity of views within the MPC, thereby making the central bank more predictable (see Tóth, 
2006). On one occasion though, the MNB decided to abstain from disclosing information on diversity among committee 
2 The analysis of the voting records of the CNB is therefore a possible topic for further research. 
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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members. At the peak of the financial turmoil in October 2008, the Monetary Council held an unscheduled meeting at 
which it decided to increase key interest rates by an amount of 300 basis points without revealing the individual votes for 
that meeting. 
In terms of monetary policy deliberations, the Monetary Council holds monthly meetings, but does not hold pre-MPC 
meetings, like e.g. the ECB’s Governing Council. As input to these meetings central bank staff prepares detailed 
macroeconomic forecasts each quarter, which are published in the Bank’s Inflation Report after an internal discussion has 
been held. These staff projections were initially conditional on unchanged policy rates and exchange rates. Effective March 
2011, the MNB changed the interest rate assumption and has used an endogenous interest rate path (see Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank, 2011). If projections depart from the inflation target on the horizon relevant for monetary policy, the Bank would 
consider a change of its key interest rates. For policy-makers the difference between the central path and the inflation 
target, the degree of uncertainty around the central path, as well as the direction of risks may matter in this respect. 
At the official meeting, the Chief Economist of the MNB (i.e. the deputy governor in charge of the Department of 
Economics) usually opens the interest rate setting discussion. Other committee members reveal their preferred interest 
rate options during a first exchange of views. Like is now practice at the FOMC, the chairman reveals his preference at 
the end of this “tour de table”. He gives a summary of the first round of interventions and takes stock of possibly different 
interest rate options raised by the committee members. During a second round members are given the opportunity to 
comment on the options considered. Following this exchange of views members formally vote on the options and agree on 
the precise wording of the MPC statement that is published shortly after the meeting. 
Currently, the Monetary Council consists of three internal members (the governor and deputy governors) and 4 external 
members, all appointed for a six year term. Its size has changed frequently but this has not changed the fact that external 
members are in a structural majority. In March 2005, the government initiated an amendment to the appointment rules 
of MPC members, which led to the appointment of four new external committee members, all of whom were nominated 
by the prime minister. Thereby the size of the committee increased to 13 members but later, given changes in appointment 
Chart 1
Votes by members of Hungary’s Monetary Council (2005 to 2010) relative to the actual decisions taken
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DECISION-MAKING IN SELECTED CEE INFLATION-TARGETING COUNTRIES
rules, the number of members gradually decreased to the currently prevailing level of 7 members. As a result the total 
number of votes cast varied considerable. The often amended appointment rules aiming at changing the composition and 
size of the committee and thus the balance of votes mirror mounting public confrontations between the MNB and the 
government on what constitutes appropriate monetary policy. Governor Járai characterized his term during the press 
conference following his last rate setting meeting in February 2007 “as one year of work and five years of fighting”. This 
can also underline that the institutional tensions resulted in increasing dissent within the Monetary Council.
Between 2005 and 2010 only 25% of the decisions were taken by unanimity. With around 39%, the average “activism” ratio 
(i.e. the number of meetings with changes in policy rate as a share of all meetings in that period) was fairly high by 
international comparison. Chart 1 provides an illustration of the directional dissents by members. It may give first 
indications on the preference distribution in the committee and it may be a reflection of time-varying uncertainty. The 
balance between agreement and dissent, and also its direction, is different between internal and external members. 
Internal members are more consensual with the decision finally taken by the committee. If they dissent it is seldom in 
favour of easing, but most of the times in favour of tightening policy rates. By contrast, external members may dissent in 
either direction but most of their dissenting votes have been in favour of easing rather than tightening policy rates. In a 
five years period, dissenting in favour of easing amounted to more than 50% of the decisions taken. Like for the Bank of 
England’s MPC, the Governor of the MNB was outvoted several times (e.g. Governor Járai almost every month around the 
end of a tightening cycle in late 2006, i.e. four times between October 2006 and February 2007; Governor Simor in March 
2009, at the beginning of the easing cycle in July 2009, and in August 2010, when the majority of the Council did not yet 
want to start a tightening cycle). 
3.2  THE CAsE of poLAND
After the turbulent times in the early years of the transition with high inflation rates in the range of 11-13 per cent, the 
NBP abandoned the exchange rate based monetary regime and introduced inflation targeting in 1998. In a first phase 
inflation targets, defined in terms of headline CPI, were set with the aim to gradually reduce inflation below the 4 per 
cent level within four years (see NBP, 1998). In a second phase (in 2002 and 2003), when actual inflation was below the 
inflation target, the central bank decided to lower the inflation target to 2.5 per cent with a ±1 per cent tolerance band 
(see NBP, 2003). With the setting of a permanent inflation target the IT regime unfolded its stabilising forces on prices. 
From 2004 to 2010 the average inflation in Poland was 2.75 per cent. The small target deviation of on average only 0.25 
per cent is an outstanding performance by international standards. In 2000, two years after the IT regime was introduced, 
Poland abandoned its crawling-peg/band regime to a basket comprising the US dollar and the euro. This meant that the 
Zloty became a freely floating currency. Like in Hungary, the switch to a flexible exchange rate regime helped the Bank 
to achieve this remarkable disinflation process. 
Like for the MNB, the Bank’s Inflation Report is a key channel for its communications with the public. The NBP made several 
improvements of its communication policy aimed at convincing the public that it was fully committed to achieving its inflation 
target. One of the elements in this respect was the publication of information regarding the individual votes of the members 
of the Monetary Policy Council. Initially, voting records were published with such a long lag that they did not usefully 
contribute to the understanding of the monetary policy process in real-time. Since 2001, with the inclusion of voting records 
in the quarterly Inflation Report, they are timelier than before. Another element was that the information content of the 
Inflation Report was substantially enhanced. For example, since 2004 forward-looking information with a risk assessment in 
the form of fan charts has been published. In addition, the format of the statements and press conferences of the Monetary 
Policy Council changed. Initially, the monetary policy decision was only explained if the interest rate was changed. During 
2000 to end-2005, the NBP gave regular explanations for each decision including a formal vote on the policy bias. Like for 
the US Federal Reserve, this “bias” could lean towards tightening, neutral or easing and was discontinued.
In terms of monetary policy deliberations, the Monetary Policy Council takes its decisions at the official monthly rate 
setting meeting. The Monetary Policy Council receives short-term forecasts on a monthly basis and longer-term projections 
based on two different macro forecasting models on a quarterly basis (since 2008 only three forecasting exercises per year 
are conducted). During the internal deliberations members discuss prominently the staff forecast that is conditional on 
market interest rates and is based on the NECMOD model. Alternatively, staff forecasts based on constant interest rates 
are prepared and these forecasts are officially published. At the meeting each member may express his/her interest rate 
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preference and propose a “motion” to change interest rates. This may lead to different interest rate proposals. Following 
an exchange of views on the outlook during which member may make an interest rate proposal, the chairman selects the 
most “extreme” proposal and holds a vote on it. If there is no majority, he chooses the next proposal and holds a vote 
and continues this procedure until a majority is in favour of that option (see Sirchenko, 2011). Then, the chairman 
concludes the discussion. At the end of the meeting, members also agree (but do not vote) on a press release with 
information on the rationale behind the interest rate decision. In line with this voting methodology the NBP, like the US 
Federal Reserve, only provides precise quantitative information regarding those committee members who voted in favour 
of the interest rate proposal. For the dissenters, it does not always provide direct information by which amount they 
dissented. We could map the individual vote by assuming that dissenters voted for the status quo option or, whenever 
more than one motion was put to voting the interest rate preferences by members were more clearly identifiable. 
As stipulated in the “new” Central Bank Act of 1997 the Monetary Policy Council comprises 10 members with (non-
staggered) six year-mandates. The NBP President (i.e. committee chairman) is the only internal member and is responsible 
for the staff of the central bank. Of the 9 external members, 3 members each are appointed by the upper house of 
Parliament, its lower house, and the President of the Republic. Hence, external members have an overwhelming majority 
in the MPC. A unique element of the appointment process of the NBP is that the contracts of all 9 external members expire 
at the same time (this was the case in 2004 and 2010). The President also has a six-year term and may be seen as the only 
source of continuity when new members are appointed, because his contract is de facto staggered.3 
3  The reason for it was that the first chairwoman Gronkiewicz-Waltz had resigned three years earlier than foreseen (in December 2000). Moreover, in 
2010, due to the tragic Polish airplane crash involving NBP President Skrzypek, the new chairman Belka took office in April, just 4 months after the 
appointment of the 9 new MPC members.
Chart 2
Votes by members of poland’s Monetary policy Council (2004 to 2010) relative to the actual decisions taken
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Source: NBP.
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While data are available for the 2000 to 2010 period, we focus on the narrower period since 2004, when the complete 
team of external members was exchanged, and for which a direct comparison with Hungary is possible (for a discussion 
of the 1998 to 2004 sample see Sirchenko, 2011). During this time around 60% of the decisions were taken by unanimity, 
a ratio that is high compared with the MNB. The voting statistics also show that under chairman Balcerowicz the committee 
voted more consensual than under chairman Skrzypek. At the same time, the “activism” ratio was with 29% significantly 
lower than in Hungary (see Table 1). While together with the observation for Hungary this seems to suggest that dissent 
in these committees is related to the frequency of policy rate changes, the case of the Fed’s FOMC which has a high 
“activism ratio” (around 50%) but few dissents would clearly contradict this logic (see Jung, 2011). Chart 2 shows the 
individual dissents by direction for the NBP. The NBP Presidents had very low dissent ratios, with chairman Balcerowicz 
slightly on the tightening side and chairman Skrzypek slightly on the easing side. Most external members were more 
strongly biased in their dissents, typically either in favour of tightening or easing. The dissent ratios were higher in the 
case of those members who generally preferred a tighter monetary stance. Like in Hungary, the President of the NBP was 
outvoted several times (e.g. chairman Balcerowicz in July, August 2005 and January, February 2006; chairman Skrzypek 
in April, June, August 2007 and November 2008 and February 2009).
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The idea that monetary policy-makers may address uncertainties and minimize the inflation bias by following a simple 
policy rule was popularized by Taylor (1993) and goes back to Milton Friedman (1960). From the debate on rules versus 
discretion, it is well known that, when setting interest rates, policy-makers consider various aspects that cannot be 
captured by means of a simple rule. For example, they typically consult a broad range of indicators and a suite of models 
in their assessments of inflationary risks. Hence, when estimating empirical reaction functions, we do not assume that 
policy-makers de facto would follow such a simple rule. For the present econometric analysis on preference heterogeneity 
it suffices that empirical reaction functions fit the data reasonably well in-sample.4
Preference heterogeneity among policy-makers cannot be observed from voting records. In order to detect such 
heterogeneity, we compare the parameters of alternative specifications of an empirical reaction function. Deviations in 
the intercept and the slope parameters may give an indication on the existence of heterogeneity in terms of preferences 
and views on key economic data. We are particularly interested in differences in the preference parameter (the intercept 
a) across members and across specifications. Differences in the intercept (a) between the aggregate and the corresponding 
pooled regression can be interpreted as an indication of preference heterogeneity. Related differences in slope parameters 
are linked to diversity of members’ views on the inflation and output forecasts.5 A further interesting question is whether 
diversity in monetary policy committees in these countries has an influence on the performance of the central bank in 
achieving its inflation target. Answering this question would require longer runs of data than are currently available, but 
this would be an interesting direction for further research.
4.1  rEACTioN fuNCTioNs for THE CEE CouNTriEs 
In the present econometric analysis, we estimate aggregate and pooled Taylor-type reaction functions using real-time 
information published in Inflation Reports such as inflation forecasts and output forecasts. While these data should broadly 
approximate the information available to policy-makers at the time of the decision, it cannot be excluded that policy-
makers take into account other, additional sources of information. Though, within the inflation-targeting strategy policy-
makers would normally rely on staff forecasts.  
The CEE countries are small, open economies. In a small open economy the inflationary consequences of changes in the 
exchange rate and implied changes of import prices may be of special relevance. Monetary policy deliberations could also 
be influenced by changes in the exchange rate. In this case, the Taylor rule should be modified so as to include the 
exchange rate change as an explanatory variable of the policy rate. Alternatively, the exchange rate can be included as a 
variable to replace the output gap in the Taylor rule. As suggested by Taylor (2001) preferably a measure of the real 
exchange rate should be used. 
An aggregate (forward-looking) Taylor rule with interest-rate smoothing describes the interest rate decision of the 
monetary policy committee as a function of the natural rate of interest, the inflation gap and the output gap, and changes 
in the exchange rate: 
4  One criterion for this is the Taylor principle, which suggests that policy-makers move a (nominal) key interest rate by more than one-for-one with 
inflation. 
5  A measure for preference heterogeneity that is sometimes used (see Owyang and Ramey, 2004) is the ratio between beta and gamma slope parameters 
for each member. Ideally, in order to measure individual beta and gamma parameters across members it would be an advantage to use members’ 
individual inflation and output (gap) forecasts in the reaction functions. Like other leading IT central banks, the CEE central banks do not disclose 
these data. Hence, estimated differences in slope parameters available from the Fixed Effects model may have limited information value, because 
they only extract information contained in the voting records. 
4  Empirical evidence on preference 
heterogeneity in the CEE countries
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 *
1(1 )( ( ) )t t h t t t ti y fx iρ α β π π γ δ ρ ν+ −= − + − + + + +  (1)
where i is the (nominal) policy rate; π is the inflation forecast; π* is the target inflation rate; y is the output gap; fx is the 
exchange rate change and t denotes the time operator and h the horizon of the inflation forecast. With regard to inflation, 
a horizon of around two years ahead corresponds to the policy horizon which these central banks normally would have in 
mind (i.e. in the absence of longer lasting shocks such as asset-price shocks). The preference parameter a is the sum of 
the natural rate of interest and the inflation target which is known for inflation targeting central banks.
Pooled Taylor-type regressions describe the notional interest rate path that would have been the result, if members’ 
individual interest rate votes were simply aggregated. This is an experiment, because it implicitly pretends that averaging 
votes and not majority voting would be the statutory voting rule of these committees. Moreover, in monetary policy 
committees the composition of members may change over time owing to staggered contracts and new appointments. 
When estimating pooled regressions, we take this element into account by specifying an unbalanced panel. Pooled 
regressions are estimated in the form of Fixed Effects models, Random Effects models and Random Coefficients models. 
The Fixed Effects model captures the possibility that each committee member has a different preference parameter ai 
(i.e. he/she is more hawkish or dovish than the committee mean) and behaves similarly regarding the slope parameters 
(b and γ). The Random Effects model is similar, but treats differences of individual preference parameters (ai) as random. 
The Random Coefficients model treats differences in policy-makers’ preferences (ai) as random but allows for variations 
in individual slope parameters (bi and γi). Assuming that in inflation targeting central banks members fully share the official 
inflation target, observing different preferences boils down to differences in the natural rate of interest across 
members. 
The Fixed Effects regression takes the following form:
 *
, , 1 ,(1 )( ( ) )n t n t h t t n t n ti y fx iρ α β π π γ δ ρ ε+ −= − + − + + + +  (2) 
and the Random Effects regression has the following representation:
 *
, , 1 ,(1 )(( ) ( ) )n t n t h t t n t n ti y fx iρ α τ β π π γ δ ρ ω+ −= − + + − + + + +  (3)
where n denotes individual members, a comprises the mean and t is a random deviation by member. The Random Effects 
model is used as a benchmark for comparison with the Fixed Effects model when applying the Hausman test. In order to 
estimate member specific slope coefficients (see Equation 4), a Random Coefficients model is specified. It has the 
following representation:
 *
, , 1 ,(1 )(( ) ( ) )n t n n t h n t n t n t n ti y fx iρ α τ β π π γ δ ρ η+ −= − + + − + + + +  (4) 
The above specifications of the reaction function follow the literature on committees (see e.g. Besley et al., 2008, and 
Jung, 2011). They incorporate the output gap in levels but not in differences. The output gap and the inflation gap are 
both stationary variables so that proper identification requires including interest rate inertia. Orphanides (2003 and 2007) 
includes the output gap both in levels and in differences. This is not needed here, because variables in differences have 
no impact on the long-term relationship. When modelling policy-makers’ reactions to new incoming information, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that policy-makers would not take changes in the output gap in a systematic manner into account, but 
at most would occasionally refer to it. In fact, the literature emphasises the high uncertainty surrounding the output gap 
itself as a useful indicator for monetary policy decision-making.
A comparison of the parameters of (1) with panel regressions (2 to 4) can provide information on three sources of 
heterogeneity in committees. First, members may share the committee’s assessment of the macroeconomic situation, 
but may be systematically biased regarding the policy response − i.e. be more hawkish or dovish than the mean voter 
in the committee (see Riboni and Ruge-Murcia, 2008). Preference heterogeneity defined that way implies different 
intercepts (a). Second, policy-makers may disagree on the response to the inflation forecast or inflation gap (see Berk 
and Bierut, 2011). This form of heterogeneity would imply different slope coefficients (b). Third, policy-makers may have 
different views on how to respond to the output gap (see Gerlach-Kristen, 2006) and to the exchange rate. This form 
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of heterogeneity would imply different slope coefficients (γ, δ). Furthermore, if individual policy-makers are less inertial 
than the committee when taking interest rate decisions (see Blinder, 1998), this would imply differences in the 
coefficient ρ.
Heterogeneity in a monetary policy committee may also be attributable to a combination of these factors. For instance, 
policy-makers may assign different weights to inflation control and output smoothing, given different interpretations of 
the central bank’s mandate. If policy-makers have a different focus on the maintenance of price stability or if the focus 
changes over time, it would imply that they have a different ratio between inflation control and output smoothing (see 
Sibert, 2002). The sacrifice ratio can be used to describe whether policy-makers are in a “hawk” or “dove” regime. 
Owyang and Ramey (2004) suggest to check the ratio σ for (supplementary) indications on policy-makers’ preferences for 
a certain regime or chairmanship.
Furthermore, some heterogeneity that results from factors not modelled in the above function may not be captured by 
the intercept and slope parameter estimates. First, committee members may distance themselves from the staff forecast 
for inflation and output (see Kohn, 2008) or there could be strategic forecasting (see Tillman, 2011).6 Second, other factors 
may affect the dynamics of committee deliberations, but the reaction function does not model them as separate sources 
of heterogeneity. Examples include other indicators of the monetary policy stance such as a monetary conditions indicator, 
different modes of leadership in a monetary policy committee (Blinder and Morgan, 2007) and disagreements among 
policy-makers on the “true” objective function of monetary policy. Third, other unobservable variables such as tenure 
and background of policy-makers may explain heterogeneity. Because most empirical studies for monetary policy 
committees of advanced countries find that these variables do not play a prominent role (see Besley et al., 2008, and 
Jung, 2011), we do not examine them further here.
Identification between the Fixed Effects and the Random Effects model is checked by means of a Hausman test for 
correlated random effects. A rejection of the Random Effects model is a first indication for systematic differences in the 
intercept (i.e. the preference parameter) across committee members, because otherwise the distribution of preferences 
around the mean would be random. Parameter equality in the aggregate regression and the corresponding pooled 
regression for a committee is checked by means of Wald-tests. The econometric approach to estimating the committees’ 
reaction functions with real-time data is in the tradition of Orphanides (2001). We check for heteroscedasticity, and where 
relevant, we apply White’s (1980) correction in order to compute heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. We also 
give consideration to the issue that model estimates in dynamic panels with real-time data could suffer from 
autocorrelation. In a dynamic panel a GMM technique (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) could provide unbiased estimates of 
the slope coefficients, but its use is not indicated here because the sample with five years of monthly observations is 
considered to be of sufficient length to be immune to a small sample bias in the time dimension. Orphanides (2001) and 
Koustas and Lamarche (2010) observe that it is appropriate to use non-linear least square estimation techniques and OLS 
(as opposed to IV or GMM estimation) when real-time data are used. In the following, results of regressions are obtained 
from OLS/NLS, pooled OLS for fixed effects and from Generalised Least Squares (GLS) random effects coefficient estimates 
(applying the Swamy-Arora estimator, for details see Baltagi, 2001). 
4.2  EMpiriCAL rEsuLTs for THE MNB AND THE NBp 
In the following, we consider two inflation targeting central banks for which voting records and real-time information on 
economic and financial indicators have been published, the MNB and the NBP. The econometric analysis focuses on the 
sample 2005 to 2010. For this sample voting records and real-time information on economic and financial indicators are 
available. At the same time, this sample is unique because it is characterised by pronounced shocks, in particular a strong 
oil price shock and a massive financial crisis. In most industrial countries, key interest rates were lowered to practically 
zero in order to address the adverse shock by the financial crisis. Still, the MNB and the NBP succeeded to keep key 
interest rates safely above zero. This is relevant, because once the zero lower bound restriction gets binding and central 
banks resort to non-standard policies, it can no longer be taken for granted that a Taylor-type rule is an appropriate 
6  Note that game theory would suggest that organising an interest-rate setting meeting in a two stage process by which policy-makers reveal their 
preferences could be seen as a way to rule out strategic voting behaviour.
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benchmark to analyse interest rate setting behaviour by policy-makers. In this case, analysis would have to be based on 
other reaction functions including a monetary base rule.
4.2.1  A real-time data base
As a first step of the empirical analysis it is useful to briefly discuss the data requirements. For the present analysis a new 
real-time data base for key economic and financial indicators and information on policy-makers’ votes from published 
voting records had to be established (see Appendix). The basic data needs for the econometric exercise are the (published) 
policy rate, members’ individual votes in terms of a policy rate, the inflation gap and the output gap, and possibly a proxy 
for the exchange rate. Data for the policy rate and the exchange rate are available from the central banks’ website. 
Individual (interest rate) votes by committee members can be extracted from the official voting records. In this respect, 
voting records of the MNB give a clear indication on the desired interest rate level by policy-maker at a certain meeting. 
In the case of the NBP sometimes votes on two interest rate options follow each other; here the first vote is the proxy for 
the interest rate preference (see Sirchenko, 2011). We calculate the inflation gap as the difference between the staff 
inflation forecast (1-2 years ahead) and the official inflation target. We use inflation forecasts which are conditioned on 
constant interest rates. While this forecast is normally part of the information set that policy-makers observe in real-time, 
policy-makers may internally also consider forecasts based on market rates or on endogenous monetary policy.7 When 
experimenting with forward-looking measures of the output gap, it turned out that these reaction functions did not yield 
satisfactory results. Therefore, we use the (contemporaneous) real-time output gap measure. As concerns the inflation 
gap and the output gap, all members are thought to base their vote on the latest staff forecast available at the time of 
the decision. When estimating the reaction functions the simplifying assumption is made that new information on 
economic indicators becomes available at the meeting when the inflation report is published. By comparison, for financial 
indicators such as the interest rate and the exchange rate latest monthly updates are available for each meeting.
An issue receiving some attention in the literature is whether using inflation forecasts in Taylor rules could give rise to 
endogeneity problems. For example, in strict inflation targeting regimes ex post interest rates may no longer react to 
changes in inflation developments. This point is more general and could become relevant whenever the inflation forecast 
at the policy horizon is by intention kept in line with the inflation target or when central banks use the own interest rate 
to condition their inflation forecast. Though, in the present study the forecast observations are based on the neutral 
assumption of constant interest rates and not on endogenous monetary policy (MNB since 2011) or market interest rates 
(NBP using NECMOD). Together with the assumptions made for other variables in the forecasting exercises, this implies 
that forecast uncertainty is still considerable. Moreover, as suggested by Boivin (2006), we tried alternative forecast 
horizons that may be different from the policy horizon in order to find out the best specification. 
A clarification why we focus on monthly data may be in order here. Basically, the argument is that a switch to the quarterly 
frequency would imply a loss of information. In pure econometric terms the use of quarterly data in our study would 
reduce the number of observations to about 20 so that the panel regressions would probably suffer from a Nickel bias. 
And also from the perspective of the monetary policy process, the use of monthly data is justified. In the committees 
considered, policy-makers meet at the monthly frequency and get a new set of indicators prior to each meeting but they 
will normally get new macro forecasts only once a quarter (since 2008 the NBP has published new forecasts only three 
times a year). There may be changes in policy-makers’ assessments in these monthly meetings based on a wide range of 
new incoming data (not only monetary and financial variables but also survey data on the macro economy). It is plausible 
to assume that at the meeting policy-makers will have a richer data set at their disposal than simply an inflation forecast. 
Policy-makers may therefore deviate from the indications of the staff forecast when they meet each month. For example, 
in the interim meetings for which no new staff forecasts become available, it can be expected that each month members 
take into account the effects, if any, of changed forecast assumptions such as oil prices and exchange rates for inflation 
and output. In part, such changes in policy-makers’ assessments can be captured by the monthly voting data on individual 
interest rate preferences. Furthermore, available studies on monetary policy committees for advanced countries use 
either monthly data or refer to the frequency of the meetings. 
7  For example, since 2011, the MNB computes staff forecasts based on endogenous monetary policy for its deliberations. Similarly, the CNB conditions 
its staff forecast on their own interest rate forecast without implying a commitment for the central bank to act accordingly.
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Before estimating the empirical reaction functions, it may be useful to briefly review some basic time series properties 
of the data and to check for the existence of cointegration relationships. If well behaved, short-term interest rates should 
be I(1)-processes, whereas inflation gaps and output gaps should be I(0). Concerning the exchange rate, it may depend on 
the exchange rate regime. When applying standard unit root tests (ADF-tests, Phillips Perron-tests) to the data, we can 
confirm that interest rates, individual interest rate preferences, and bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro are I(1).8 
However, the results for the inflation gaps and output gaps are more borderline, i.e. depending on the test setting and 
critical significance level somewhere between I(0) and I(1). In fact, it cannot be excluded that these variables are I(1) in 
the rather short sample considered. Gerlach-Kristen (2003b) and Österholm (2005) suggest that, if data in the Taylor rule 
are non-stationary, cointegration is a necessary property both for consistent estimation of the parameters of the model 
and compatibility between the model and the data. They argue that in the absence of cointegration, parameters in Taylor 
rule regressions are likely to be inconsistently estimated, and caution would be warranted before central bank policy is 
evaluated using such methods. 
In order to address this point, we apply Johansen cointegration tests as rough specification tests. We include alternative 
pairings of the interest rates (i), inflation gaps (π−π*), output gaps (y) and (bilateral) euro exchange rates (fx). Compared 
to other cointegration tests, the Johansen test has the advantage that it reports information about the number of 
cointegrating vectors (cointegration rank). It is, however, somewhat sensitive to the lag structure and requires longer runs 
of data to provide robust results. Moreover, we also include bivariate tests between an explanatory variable and the policy 
8  For brevity of the analysis, the results of the unit root tests are not reported here, but are available upon request from the authors.
Table 3
Johansen tests for the number of cointegrating vectors
system rank r Trace statistics 95% critical value result
Hungary
i, (π−π*)
= 0
≤ 1
22.30**
 3.73
15.49
 3.84
One cointegration vector
i, y
= 0
≤ 1
 10.82
 1.23 
15.49
 3.84
No cointegration vector
i, fx
= 0
≤ 1
 13.42
 1.76 
15.49
 3.84
No cointegration vector
i, (π−π*), y
= 0
≤ 1
≤ 2
34.75**
 10.84 
 1.86
29.80
15.49
3.84
One cointegration vector
i, (π−π*), y, fx
= 0
≤ 1
≤ 2
≤ 3
 43.40 
 23.17
 10.70
 1.59
47.86
29.80
15.49
3.84
No cointegration vector 
poland
i, (π−π*)
= 0
≤ 1
 17.18**
 4.59**
15.49
 3.84
Two cointegration vectors
i, y
= 0
≤ 1
 19.06**
 5.40** 
15.49
 3.84
Two cointegration vectors
i, fx
= 0
≤ 1
 17.10**
 6.29** 
15.49
 3.84
Two cointegration vectors
i, (π−π*), y
= 0
≤ 1
≤ 2
58.29**
 12.98
 5.34 
29.80
15.49
3.84
One cointegration vector
i, (π−π*), fx
= 0
≤ 1
≤ 2
 26.85
 13.93
 4.38 
29.80
15.49
3.84
No cointegration vector
i, (π−π*), y, fx
= 0
≤ 1
≤ 2
≤ 3
 57.58** 
 25.10**
 9.16
 0.49
47.86
29.80
15.49
3.84
Two cointegration vectors
Notes: Johansen test for cointegration rank r with four lags, Poland: 2000:6−2010:11, Hungary: 2005:10−2010:11. 
** denotes significance at the five percent level (eigenvalue statistics provide similar indications).
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rate (thereby mimicking the classical Engle-Granger cointegration test). Table 3 shows the results from this exercise. For 
Hungary, the Johansen test is ambiguous, because it indicates one cointegration relationship between the interest rate 
and the inflation gap but also between the interest rate, the inflation gap and the output gap. Here, bivariate cointegration 
tests may help further. They indicate that both the output gap and the exchange rate (HUF/EUR) is not a long-run driver 
of the Hungarian policy rate. Applying similar reasoning for Poland, the Johansen test indicates that the relevant 
cointegration relationship is between interest rates, the inflation gap and the output gap. Cointegration tests also reject 
the view that the exchange rate could substitute the output gap in the reaction function (see Siklos and Ábel, 2003). 
Adding the bilateral exchange rate (ZL/EUR) in levels to the system leads to two cointegration vectors. It seems that the 
exchange rate plays an independent role which could only be captured within a system. 
4.2.2  Empirical reaction functions with interest rate smoothing
We estimate the reaction functions of the two monetary policy committees using Taylor-type rules (equation 1 to 3) with 
interest rate smoothing. Table 4 shows that as expected these regressions have a high explanatory power and parameters 
are significant at conventional levels. Slope coefficients are significant with the correct sign. The policy rate reacts 
positively to an inflationary shock and to shocks that widen the output gap or imply a depreciation of the domestic 
currency vis-à-vis the euro. A number of interesting results emerge from the estimates. 
First, the reaction function for the NBP takes the form observed for other Western European central banks such as the 
Bank of England (see Besley et al., 2008) and the Sveriges Riksbank (see Jung, 2011). The parameters for the (forward-
looking) inflation gap and the (contemporaneous) output gap are significant for the NBP. The coefficient for the exchange 
rate is not, presumably, because it plays a separate and less systematic role in the deliberations. An issue arises with the 
inflation gap coefficient (b), which in the aggregate version fully corresponds to the Taylor principle (b>1), but not for the 
pooled versions of the regression. This might be an indication of heterogeneity, because it seems to suggest that the 
committee as a whole follows a classical Taylor rule, whereas some of its members would not. We address this issue further 
by means of a cluster analysis below. For the MNB the (forward-looking) inflation gap is significant, the coefficient is in 
line with the Taylor principle, but the output gap is not significant in conjunction with a forward-looking measure of the 
inflation gap. This finding is, however, in line with the above bivariate cointegration tests and other studies in the 
literature. Some studies suggest that in Taylor rules for Hungary the output gap is insignificant even when final data and 
GMM techniques are applied (see e.g. Hidi, 2006 and Mohanty and Klau, 2004). In our sample several proxies of the real 
effective exchange rate and of bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro or the US dollar were not significant either. The 
emphasis in Hungary seems to be on smoothing output volatility in the context of achieving the inflation target. Still, these 
reaction functions with a zero weight on output stabilisation are capable of capturing the interest-rate channel. 
For Hungary, we also checked the sensitivity of the results to the magnitude of the inflation target. When using an 
alternative inflation target of 4.5%, which may be seen as being closer to an equilibrium value, we obtained comparable 
results, but the intercept a was no longer significant in the aggregate Taylor rule. Moreover, a significant part of the 
observed deviation of inflation outcome from the target can be attributed to temporary factors outside the control of the 
central bank such as VAT increases. On both grounds, we conclude that using the official inflation target in this framework 
is appropriate. Moreover, the special importance of the exchange-rate channel in real-time decision-making can neither 
be confirmed for the Polish nor for the Hungarian monetary policy. In line with the above cointegration tests, when adding 
the exchange rate in levels, it turns out that the overall specification deteriorates in terms of significance of the other 
variables. This may be related to the observation that the exchange rate may have played a role in the deliberations of 
these committees but its importance is either related to certain episodes or the information content of the exchange rate 
is already picked by the inflation gap. Hence, our estimations rely on the interest rate channel as the most prominent 
channel of monetary policy transmission. 
Second, inertia are very important as suggested by the high values of ρ. As is well known, a large part of the interest rate 
level at time t is explained by the previous interest rate. This is explained by the fact that at a policy meeting in interest 
rates are either unchanged or changes are made by small amounts of usually 25 to 75 basis points (on rare occasions MNB 
has made moves in excess of 100 basis points). Moreover, observed differences in the inertia coefficient between aggregate 
and pooled regression, as confirmed by Wald-tests, support Binder’s (1998) notion according to which committees are more 
inertial than individual policy-makers. Third, for the MNB and the NBP the Hausman test selects the Random Effects model 
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implying that preference heterogeneity in both committees is not systematic. Fourth, applying Wald-tests to the 
preference parameter (a) signals the existence of some preference heterogeneity within the NBP, but clearly rejects its 
existence within the MNB. Applying Wald-tests to the slope coefficients between corresponding aggregate and pooled 
reaction functions (see shaded rows in Table 4) suggests that diversity in policy-makers’ views on the inflation gap is 
measurable for both the MNB and the NBP. In addition, the test detects diversity in policy-makers’ views on the output 
gap in the case of NBP. 
Fifth, using the mid-point of the NBP’s inflation target of 2.5% would yield (implied) estimates of the natural (real) rate of 
interest r* in a range of 0.8% to 1.9% depending on the specification. Brzoza-Brzezina (2006) points out that the natural 
rate in Poland shows a high variability and crucially depends on the sample. For comparison, during 1998 to 2004, they 
provide an estimate for the natural real rate of about 4.6 to 5% for Poland. It should be noted that inflation during this 
period was declining substantially from high levels of about 12%, and since 2004 stabilised at levels close to the inflation 
target. Moreover, for Hungary, given the official inflation target of 3%, our estimates imply a range of 3.5% to 4% for the 
natural rate of interest. We are not aware of any study for Hungary that could provide a benchmark for comparison in this 
respect. Poland and Hungary are both transition economies. Hence, any estimate of the natural rate of interest is 
expected to be time-varying and sample dependent.
 
Table 4
Empirical reaction functions with interest rate smoothing 
 Coefficients
Equation
a b γ δ ρ prob. Adj. r2 obs.
pooled 
obs.
Hungary
Aggregate 6.465
(1.084)
3.392*
(1.599)
− − 0.955*
(0.039)
0.92  61 −
Fixed 
Effects 
6.777
(0.315)
1.230
(0.197)
− − 0.831
(0.021)
0.92  60 590
Random 
Effects 
7.017
(0.155)
1.344*
(0.209)
− − 0.842*
(0.020)
0.322 0.92  60 590
poland
Aggregate 3.302*
(0.536)
1.193*
(0.500)
0.605*
(0.235)
− 0.939*
(0.026)
0.95  73 −
Fixed 
Effects 
4.361
(0.139)
0.565
(0.093)
0.258
(0.047)
− 0.734
(0.026)
0.90  73 721
Random 
Effects 
4.339*
(0.122)
0.515*
(0.097)
0.250*
(0.051)
− 0.749*
(0.025)
0.086 0.88  73 721
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Hungary: 2005:11−2010:11; Poland: 2004:1−2010:1. Prob.: Hausman specification test selects the Random Effects 
model, if the probability exceeds 5% − otherwise the Fixed Effects model is selected. * indicates that Wald tests reject that parameters in the selected 
(shaded) aggregate and pooled regressions are equal at 5% level.
 
4.2.3  Cluster analysis for the MNB and the NBp
A further way to examine the results from the empirical reaction function is to check the clustering of the individual 
preference parameters (ai) in the Fixed Effects (FE) model and of the slope parameters in the Random Coefficients model 
(RC). Such type of analysis could give clues on whether there is scope for the government to actively influence the 
composition of a monetary policy committee with political business cycle considerations in mind whenever it has to decide 
on new appointments. For the UK, Hix, Høland and Vivyan (2010) use a “dove-hawk” scale for the Bank of England’s MPC 
and reject the idea that the British government seeks to appoint more dovish members prior to elections. We use a cluster 
analysis as a robustness check in order to find out whether a link exists between the preference of committee members 
and their role in the committee. According to the literature, it would be expected that internal members are more hawkish 
and external members are more dovish. In a first step, we study the distribution of the preference parameter from the 
Fixed Effects model (1). In a second step, we extract the distribution of the slope parameter(s) from the Random 
Coefficients model (4). Because individual forecasts by members of inflation and output are not available, these slope 
parameters only extract information on diversity from the voting records.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PREFERENCE HETEROGENEITY IN THE CEE COUNTRIES
Chart 3 shows a scatter plot of the individual parameters ai (obtained from the FE model) for the MNB and the NBP grouped 
according to different modes of membership (internal member, external member, chairman). This exercise is a robustness 
check, and it goes beyond the indications of the Hausman test according to which differences in the intercept should be 
random. For the MNB, in line with what the literature finds for the Bank of England’s MPC, the different width of the 
parameter distribution and the position relative to the committee mean suggest that internal members may be on average 
more hawkish than the external members. This would explain why in 2005 the Hungarian government may have had an 
incentive to enlarge the MPC by adding external members. At the same time, external members may be hawkish or dovish 
depending on the individual member so that it is not on safe grounds to conclude that preferences of internal members 
are always more hawkish than those of external members. Interestingly, chairman Simor takes a position in the middle of 
the committee. This is a natural position for a chairman who assumes the role of a consensus builder in the Monetary 
Council. Finally, it is conceivable that a third cluster exists across different modes of memberships with a preference 
structure that is more dovish than the committee mean and where membership is not the explanatory factor. By contrast, 
in the case of the NBP, where all members except the chairman are external members, no distinction along the above 
lines can be made. Here, members’ preferences cluster closely around the committee’s mean with the exception of the 
chairman’s preference which takes a corner position (Balcerowicz at the hawkish end, Skrzypek at the dovish end). It may 
explain the observation that aggregate and pooled preference parameters are different even though deviations are found 
to be random. In practical terms, this setting may imply that whenever the chairman assumes an extreme position with 
regard to an interest rate proposal other committee members may not follow him or dissent. In press reports for Poland, 
the two chairmen Balcerowicz and Skrzypek are characterized as being on the opposite scale of a hawk-dove classification. 
The first one dissented several times in favor of tighter interest rates, whereas the latter one always dissented for easing 
of rates (see Chart 2). The study by Kotlowski (2005) confirms this notion by providing evidence covering the period 2004 
to 2005 which suggests that chairman Balcerowicz was among the most hawkish members of the Monetary Policy Council. 
In order to check how different views about the economic outlook impact on interest rate setting, we make a further 
experiment for Hungary and Poland and use the test results from the Random Coefficients model. For the MNB our 
comparisons of members’ responses to new economic data have to be based on the slopes (bi) which measure the response 
to changes in the expected inflation gap. We cannot compute sacrifice ratios as in the case of Poland, because for Hungary 
the output gap is not significant. For the NBP the individual slope parameter distributions (bi/γi) provide individual sacrifice 
ratios (σi) that allow us to check whether members respond more or less aggressively to changes in the inflation and output 
gap (see Sibert, 2002; Owyang and Ramey, 2004). 
For Hungary anecdotal evidence suggests that some members have had difficulties to accept the inflation targeting 
framework and have continued to support other goals, thereby being perceived on the more dovish side when there are 
changes in the inflation gap. We look into the distribution of the slope parameter bi across committee members which are 
Chart 3
preference clusters of committee members: The MNB versus the NBp
MNB members (2005 to 2010) NBP members (2005 to 2010)
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7
7.2
7.4
0 internal external chairman
Membership status Membership status
Preference parameter Preference parameter
α(i)
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4
4.1
4.2
0 external chairman
α(i)
Note: Estimates from Fixed Effects model. Membership takes different values. A solid, horizontal line shows the average preference parameter for 
these members. Members with short observation periods have been excluded from the panel. Note: deviations of the mean value of a from the values 
reported in Table 4 are due to differences in the sample used for the estimations.
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obtained from the Random Coefficients model. This offers a further check for robustness and allows evaluating the above 
results. The reaction of members to the inflation gap provides an indication on how aggressive they respond to inflationary 
shocks. In terms of the reaction to the inflation gap, Chart 4 (LHS) confirms that somewhat different reaction patterns 
depending on the membership status can be observed. For the MNB, as illustrated by the two clusters, internal members 
tend to react more aggressively to the inflation gap than external members. The chairman takes a neutral position in the 
committee. Interestingly, all members individually respect the Taylor principle (b > 1). For the NBP anecdotal evidence 
suggests, that chairman Balcerowicz stood out as a very hawkish member, whereas chairman Skrzypek was often referred 
to as a very dovish member. Chart 4 (RHS) shows that chairman Balcerowicz takes a neutral position close to the mean, 
i.e. he reacts similar to the other members to new incoming economic data, whereas also here chairman Skrzypek is 
identified as the most dovish member by far. All other (external) members are close and evenly distributed around the 
mean, with half of them on the hawkish side and half of them on the dovish side.
Chart 4
Clusters of MNB and NBp members to the sacrifice ratio and the inflation gap respectively
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
0
Membership
β(i)
MNB members (2005 to 2010)
internal external chairman
Slope parameter beta
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
0
Membership
β(i)/γ(i)
NBP members (2005 to 2010)
external chairman
Sacrifice ratio
Notes: Estimates from the Random Coefficients model. A solid, horizontal line shows the average parameter for these members. Members with short 
observation periods have been excluded from the panel. Note: deviations of the mean value of slope parameters from the values reported in Table 4 
are due to differences in the sample used for the estimations.
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In this paper we have estimated empirical reaction functions for the Monetary Council of the central bank of Hungary and 
the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland to study preference heterogeneity in these policy committees. 
We are aware that detecting diversity in monetary policy committees may be hampered by several factors that are linked 
to the confidential nature of the policy-making process. That is why we pursue an indirect measurement using empirical 
reaction functions for the monetary policy committees in two of the largest CEE countries during the period 2005−2010. 
Moreover, the debate on rules versus discretion has clarified that, when setting interest rates, policy-makers consider 
various aspects that cannot be captured by means of a simple rule. For example, they typically consult a broad range of 
indicators and a suite of models in their assessments of inflationary risks. Hence, when estimating empirical reaction 
functions, we do not assume that policy-makers de facto would follow such a simple rule. The present comparison of the 
intercept and slope parameters from aggregate and pooled Taylor-type reaction functions estimated using real-time 
information on economic and financial indicators and voting records allows for a structural interpretation of information 
on members’ preferences, as contained in voting records. For both committees the parameter of the inflation gap in the 
estimated reaction functions is significant and has the expected sign. In case of Poland the output gap is also significant, 
while for Hungary, in line with the literature, it is not. Moreover, the parameter for the exchange rate is in both cases not 
significant, thereby rejecting a separate and systematic effect coming from that variable. These findings are supported 
by separate Johansen cointegration tests.
Applying these empirical reaction functions, the paper suggests that like for other central banks in the Western 
hemisphere, diversity across policy-makers is an important feature of voting by monetary policy committees in inflation-
targeting countries of the CEE. Unlike for monetary policy committees of advanced economies (see Besley et al., 2008, 
and Jung, 2011), we find preference heterogeneity to be random for both the members of the Polish Monetary Policy 
Council and those of the Monetary Council of the MNB. Then, by means of a cluster analysis of members’ individual 
preference parameters we show that in both committees internal and external members may vote differently. The MNB 
case illustrates that internal and external members may mainly differ in terms of their reaction to changes in the economic 
outlook. By and large, internal members react more aggressively in response to changes in the inflation gap than external 
members. In this case, the chairman takes a neutral position in the committee, which is a natural position for a chairman 
who assumes the role of a consensus builder. The NBP is an example of a committee with different preferences between 
the chairman (i.e. the only internal member) and external members. Members’ preferences cluster closely around the 
committee mean with the exception of the chairman’s preference which takes a corner position (Balcerowicz at the 
hawkish end, Skrzypek at the dovish end). This may imply that whenever the chairman assumes an extreme position with 
regard to interest rate setting the other committee members may not follow him and dissent. Finally, a possible direction 
for further research would be to assess the question whether observed preference heterogeneity in these committees 
influences the performance of the central bank in achieving its inflation target.
5  Conclusions
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Voting records and real-time data for Hungary are from the bank’s website: http://english.mnb.hu/Statisztika and 
http://english.mnb.hu/Monetaris_politika/decision-making/voting-records-of-the-mc-members. Real-time data for the 
National Bank of Poland are from the bank’s website: http://www.nbp.pl/homen.aspx?c=/ascx/subgen.ascx&navid=5072. 
 
Table A.1
Database and sources
Hungary poland
Voting records  
(interest rate preferences)
Extracted from MNB minutes Extracted from NBP inflation reports and based on 
Sirchenko (2011)
inflation Central Statistical Office Central Statistical Office
inflation forecast MNB inflation reports NBP inflation reports
output gap (actual outcome)
Own estimates based on Central Statistical Office NBP inflation reports since 2007, OECD measure for 
period before
output gap (real-time)
Recursive estimates based on real-time information 
published by Central Statistical Office and MNB 
inflation reports, alternatively the OECD measure 
was used
Reported in NBP inflation reports since 2007, a 
real-time OECD measure is used for the periods 
before
Exchange rate (real-time)
MNB (available monthly). Several measures were 
used (HUF/EUR, HUF/USD, real effective exchange 
rate)
NBP (available monthly). Several measures were 
used (ZL/EUR, ZL/USD, real effective exchange 
rate)
policy rate MNB NBP
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